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Globalization, Party Positions, 
and the Median Voter
by huGh Ward, laWrence ezroW, and han dorussen*
this article examines the effects of economic globalization on the policy platforms of social democratic parties in Western europe. 
some leading social democrats have suggested that globalization con-
strains their policy options. u.K. labor Party chancellor Gordon brown 
stated, for instance, in his Mansion house speech on June 21, 2006:
but in my view no advanced industrial economy facing global competition can 
either shelter their old industries or services, nor can they neglect the big, serious,  
and long-term challenges that arise from this new phase of globalization: the 
challenge of resisting all forms of protectionism and instead breaking down the 
barriers to an open trading global economy; the challenge of moving europe from 
its days as a trade bloc—inward looking and unreformed—to global europe,  
outward looking, competitive, reforming and with a modern social dimension.1
even more dramatically, the antiglobalization movement sees power 
leaking from weaker states to institutions articulating the interests of 
global capital, such as the international Monetary Fund (imf) and the 
World bank.2 it identifies multinational firms, financial corporations, 
and elites in newly industrializing countries like china and india as 
the winners from globalization and the poor in the south as well as the 
unskilled working class and lower-middle-class workers in the richer 
north as the losers. these latter groups together with the trade unions 
and public sector workers are traditionally viewed as the key constitu-
encies of social democratic parties.3 in order to maintain their elec-
toral base, when in power social democratic parties promote policies 
that favor these interests, including Keynesian demand management 
to ensure low unemployment, industrial policies to promote economic 
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3 For partisan theories of electoral politics in particular, see hibbs 1987.
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growth, redistributive taxation, extensive welfare provisions, and a large 
public sector. arguably globalization calls this pattern into question4 
and generates constraints that force center-left parties to converge on 
the positions of the center right for two reasons. First, because capital 
is increasingly globally networked,5 if the left doesn’t converge capital 
will tend to relocate where tax rates and social costs of production are 
lower, labor markets are less regulated, and counterinflationary policy 
and balanced budgets are a higher priority. second, because financial 
markets have been deregulated,6 unless the left converges, speculative 
investors who dislike government policy can pose the threat of currency 
crises linked to movement of capital out of the national currency.
the literature suggests that the effects of globalization are actually 
conditional on a number of institutional factors and choices made by 
governments. our contribution is to explicitly model the way the im-
pact of globalization is mediated by domestic party competition. We 
argue that the position of the median voter determines the effects of 
economic globalization on social democratic parties. theories that em-
phasize links between parties and their core support groups (partisan 
theories) can be overly simplistic because social democratic parties typ-
ically have to compromise on core principles to make themselves more 
appealing to middle-class voters in the political center ground. if the 
median voter is expected to be far enough to the right, social demo-
cratic party positions will not be constrained by globalization. their 
policies will be sufficiently business friendly anyway because of the need 
to reflect the preferences of the electorate. however, social democratic 
parties are likely to be under pressure to shift their policies to the right 
when facing the combination of a globalized national economy and a 
left-leaning electorate.
our theoretical argument adapts donald Wittman’s7 formal model 
of party competition, which assumes parties maximize expected utility 
given uncertainty about the distribution of the electorate. We add a 
perceptual globalization constraint, which may or may not be effective 
depending on the expected position of the median. if the median is far 
enough to the left, the constraint is effective and the party moves to the 
right fearing severe electoral costs; but if the median is far enough to 
the right, the constraint does not affect the party’s position. the model 
further helps us to understand possible second-order effects on parties 
 globalization/part y poSitionS/median voter 511
8 Quinn and toyoda 2008.
9 studies in which the dependent variable is a measure of public policy, such as business taxa-
tion, often include the proportion of time the left has been in power interacted with indicators of 
globalization, e.g., hays 2003. however, the second-order prediction of our model also suggests the 
inclusion of an interaction between the proportion of time the right has been in power and indicators 
of globalization.
10 budge et al. 2001.
11 Mcdonald and budge 2005. admittedly, the way such pledges affect policy is complex, because 
governments also respond to organized interests and pressures from the international system.
12 rodrik 1997.
of the right when social democratic parties are constrained. We predict 
that the parties of the right will move to the right, but to a lesser extent 
than without an effective constraint.
the formal model also demonstrates that unless empirical studies 
include an interaction between measures of globalization and the po-
sition of the median voter, they are misspecified. dennis Quinn and 
a. Maria toyoda8 show that voter and party ideology are important to 
an explanation of the international diffusion of financial market dereg-
ulation. their study calls attention to the risk of omitted variable bias 
when domestic factors are ignored.9 We report empirical evidence from 
fifteen West european countries between 1973 and 2002 that supports 
the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent 
on the position of the median voter. the main dependent variable is 
party position derived from analysis of manifesto data.10 to date, most 
of the empirical literature on globalization has focused on measures of 
policy. since this article is primarily concerned with party competition, 
policy pledges of parties are arguably the appropriate empirical focus. 
Moreover, these policy pledges tend to affect policy in the long run.11 
We find that interaction terms between measures of globalization and 
the median are significant, with the expected sign both in models of 
general left-right position and in models of policy on the welfare state. 
We also report results on taxation levels that suggest pressures on par-
ties’ policy pledges do feed through to some policy outputs.
globalization, pledgeS, and policieS
a key question in the debate on globalization is whether one of its 
effects is to undermine the welfare states that developed in nearly all 
advanced industrial economies after the end of the second World War. 
in the earliest phase of the debate scholars often came to pessimistic 
conclusions. For example dani rodrik12 argues that while globaliza-
tion results in an increased demand for compensation through the wel-
fare state, it also reduces the ability of governments to perform that role 
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effectively. eventually governments can no longer finance the required 
income transfers because companies that pay significant amounts of 
corporate taxes become footloose and relatively unconcerned with so-
cial cohesion. even though he does not predict a “race to the bottom” 
in all forms of regulation of business, Fritz scharpf expects globaliza-
tion to result in a reduction of taxes on profits and downward pressure 
on social regulation and labor standards.13 torben iversen and thomas 
cusack argue that apparent effects of globalization are actually due to 
deindustrialization linked to technical change.14
 it has become more common to see the effects as contingent on in-
stitutional variation. Geoffrey Garrett argues that macroeconomic suc-
cess is possible in coherent systems in which the left dominates politi-
cally, unions organize a high percentage of the labor force, and national 
wage deals struck in corporatist bargaining can be made to stick.15 the 
left’s core constituency will demand compensation for the economic 
insecurity resulting from globalization. he finds that coherent left 
systems are willing and able to meet these demands since corporatist 
national wage bargaining prevents erosion of productivity gains from 
investment and protects the competitiveness of the vital international 
sector. Garrett’s empirical work supports the hypothesis of welfare state 
expansion in coherent left systems as compared to coherent right sys-
tems or those in which the left’s power is more ambiguous. carles boix 
finds that once financial deregulation occurs, whether socialist parties 
use deficits as a macroeconomic tool is inversely related to the degree of 
social corporatism.16
another theory that emphasizes the conditional nature of globaliza-
tion effects is put forward by Peter hall and david soskice who argue 
that both liberal market economies (lmes) and coordinated market 
economies (cmes) are coherent varieties of capitalism and exhibit com-
plementarities between the way the labor market and corporate systems 
are coordinated.17 countries approximating the lme ideal type (such as 
the u.s. and the u.K.) and the cme ideal type (such as Germany and the 
nordic countries) have strong potential for growth because they embody 
distinct forms of national comparative advantage.18 in cmes, the rela-
tively high degree of welfare provision and unemployment protection 
13 scharpf 1998.
14 iversen and cusack 2000.
15 Garrett 1998, 80–81.
16 boix 2000.
17 hall and soskice 2001. iversen and soskice 2009 argue that proportional representation may 
also be a complementary political institution for cmes.
18 hall and Gingerich 2009; cf. Kenworthy 2006.
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encourage workers to develop firm and industry-specific skills that 
complement the structure of corporate coordination with its emphasis 
on longer-term finance and long-standing networks of implicit con-
tracts. these complementarities support comparative advantage in 
incremental innovation.19 cmes’ welfare and labor-market policies are 
not static, but neither are they especially threatened by globalization. 
indeed existing policies are often supported by business.20
the empirical literature finds evidence for modest, if any, welfare 
retrenchment due to globalization.21 although the pace of welfare state 
expansion slowed in the 1980s, few countries experienced real decline 
in expenditure. institutional path dependence strongly affects national 
responses to external pressures, and internal problems such as aging 
populations may be more significant than external ones. brian burgoon 
finds welfare policies to be conditional on which groups are adversely 
affected by globalization, what policies are offered to ameliorate those 
effects, and whether offsetting policies are opposed by powerful groups 
such as business. duane swank observes that high public-sector deficits 
and anglo-saxon domestic institutions seem to interact with high cap-
ital mobility to produce welfare state retrenchment. in addition, James 
allan and lyle scruggs find distinct differences between left and right 
welfare policies for some periods and limited evidence for others.22
similar weak and contingent effects of globalization are found for 
other core economic policies such as taxation, spending, macroeco-
nomic policy, and business regulation. swank and sven steinmo pro-
vide some evidence that globalization cuts statutory rates of corporate 
tax but not its effective rate (after allowing for state subsidies to busi-
ness), and they find ambiguous evidence that globalization shifts the 
tax burden onto labor and consumption. Jude hays agrees that there 
has not been a race to the bottom, but finds that the tax burden has 
shifted over time towards labor—especially in consensus democracies. 
scott basinger and Mark hallerberg find that states react to others’ 
attempts to attract investment by making tax cuts, but the degree to 
which they do so depends on the domestic veto structure and their ex-
pectations about other states’ political costs for cutting taxes. Globaliza-
tion may affect only countries with relatively large asset endowments 
19 cf. taylor 2009.
20 estevez-abe, iversen, and soskice 2001; hall and soskice 2001; Pontusson forthcoming. how-
ever Venn 2009 finds a strong negative correlation across organization of economic cooperation and 
development countries between levels of employment protection in 1985 and changes in employment 
protection from 1985 to 2008, with cmes generally subject to reductions.
21 van Kersbergen 2000; Pierson 2006.
22 burgoon 2001; swank 2005; allan and scruggs 2004.
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because only they have a chance of attracting footloose capital. it may 
sometimes lead to de facto leveling up of business regulation because 
capital in developing countries wants access to markets with higher 
product standards.23
different indicators of globalization suggest sometimes contradic-
tory effects on spending.24 some intertemporal and cross-national 
inconsistency could derive from the partisan model25 that underpins 
much of the empirical literature on the impact of globalization. in that 
model parties primarily respond to the preferences of their activists and 
core constituencies. in contrast, in the formal spatial model outlined 
below, these preferences only determine on which side of the median 
voter parties locate. Partisan theory largely ignores the idea that parties 
have to respond to shifts in public opinion, an observation for which 
James adams, Michael clark, lawrence ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow 
find clear empirical evidence.26 so far, however, little attention has been 
given to the possible effects of globalization on public opinion and the 
possible indirect implications for party competition.
ronald rogowski’s27 model considers the effects of the median voter 
and the structure of the domestic economy on party competition. the 
median voter has different preferences over policy to those of capital, 
but her utility is also a function of labor’s share of national income. 
Moving policy toward capital results in increased inward investment; 
hence the median voter gets a bigger payoff from this other compo-
nent of her utility but loses in terms of policy. under pressure due to 
more mobile capital, parties converge on more business-friendly poli-
cies only if the median’s policy preferences are initially close enough to 
those of business. in the alicia adserà and boix28 model, the decision 
to open the economy and the decision about funding the welfare state 
are taken together. the median voter is assumed to belong to an indus-
try that gains from openness only if the world economy is doing well. if 
it is not, she may still be attracted by a compensation package from the 
party favoring openness. Funding of this package depends on which 
industries gain from openness and by how much.
these models represent a considerable advance for the study of the 
effects of globalization, but differ from ours in two respects. First, they 
23 swank and steinmo 2002; hays 2003; basinger and hallerberg 2004; cai and triesman 2005; 
Vogel 1995.
24 Garrett and Mitchell 2001; brady, seeleib-Kaiser, and beckfield 2005.
25 Kitschelt 2001.
26 adams et al. 2004.
27 rogowski 2003.
28 adserà and boix 2002.
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assume that parties are purely office seekers, which we find implau-
sible in light of the evidence that left and right parties adopt distinctive 
policies over long periods. Party differentiation can be explained by in-
voking party policy goals together with uncertainty about the distribu-
tion of the electorate in a one-dimensional space.29 second, the earlier 
studies focus on specific issues while we seek to explain the broad char-
acter of the party programs. our theoretical contribution is to model 
the effects of globalization allowing for parties with policy goals and 
for uncertainty over the voter distribution. in this setup it is clear that 
an effective constraint moves social democratic parties to the right, but 
there are also nonobvious implications. even though globalization does 
not constrain parties on the right, it still affects their policy platforms 
because, in turn, they react to what the left does. consequently, it al-
lows these parties to adopt positions closer to their ideal policy goals 
and move to the right, albeit to a lesser extent than left parties.
We also contribute to the emerging empirical literature on global-
ization and party competition in which it has become common to rely 
on data from the comparative Manifesto Project (cmp). For example 
adams, andrea haupt, and heather stoll use cmp data to estimate the 
impact of public opinion and globalization on party positions. they 
find that unlike members of other party families, left parties seem nei-
ther affected by the position of the median nor systematically affected 
by globalization. they explain these results using the idea that such 
parties are ideological, programmatic, and give much more power to 
their members, and therefore are less likely to be influenced by external 
forces. in contrast, we argue that any left responsiveness depends on the 
location of the median voter.30 helen Milner and benjamin Judkins31 
use measures of party attitude toward trade openness and government 
intervention derived from the cmp to test whether the left and right’s 
positions have converged as a consequence of globalization. they find 
that globalization has reduced differences in position conditional on 
institutional factors. however, they do not control for the position of 
the median. stephen nelson and christopher Way32 recode cmp data 
to define a dummy for large rightward shifts in the position of left par-
ties and then estimate hazard-rate models of such turning points. they 
29 budge et al. 2001; calvert 1985; duggan and Fey 2005.
30 adams, haupt, and stoll 2009. some care is needed when comparing our study with adams, 
haupt, and stoll’s since there are slight differences in the empirical setup of the studies. adams et al. 
2004 focuses on nine countries for the period 1976–98.
31 Milner and Judkins 2004.
32 nelson and Way 2007.
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find no evidence that shifts in the position of the median matter, but 
increased portfolio investment—one indicator of globalization—seems 
to reduce the hazard rate. again this study does not allow for the pos-
sibility that the impact of globalization is conditional on the position 
of the median. Jonas Pontusson and david rueda33 also use cmp data 
and, to our knowledge, theirs is the only other study that conditions 
party response to the position of the median voter. they show that 
parties of the left respond to increasing inequality if voter turnout is 
high enough. they argue that the core constituencies of left parties 
can counteract pressure to move to the center. like them, we assume 
that parties have policy goals they are willing to trade against higher 
chances of winning.
a formal model of party competition under globalization
Parties are assumed to maximize expected policy payoffs. Globaliza-
tion affects these because it impacts on parties’ perceived chances of 
holding office. We assume that social democratic politicians believe 
they cannot win elections if they adopt policies that are too far to the 
left given their nation’s location in the global economy because such 
policies would lack credibility. there are various possible scenarios in 
which the electorate might anticipate policy u-turns. Policies that are 
unpopular with the business community could make businesses reluc-
tant to invest domestically. if policies lead to large deficits, they may 
have to be reversed because of bond market demand for a high-risk 
premium or because higher domestic interest rates squeeze consump-
tion and investment. in extremis, they might be reversed under bail-
out terms by international institutions like the imf. loss of confidence 
in foreign-exchange markets can lead to policy reversal as a fixed ex-
change rate comes under pressure. attempts to keep interest rates low 
may have to be reversed because low interest rates lead to outflow of 
speculative capital.
 the critical factor for party competition is not whether any of these 
scenarios actually eventuate, but whether politicians believe their poli-
cies are credible to the median voter. the effects of globalization are 
complex and highly contingent because different groups of voters and 
businessmen respond to specific policies in various ways that are diffi-
cult to predict. thinking in terms of whether a particular left-right po-
sition is credible given the level of globalization is procedurally rational 
33 Pontusson and rueda 2010.
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for parties and cuts through complexities.34 a number of specific policy 
packages may be consistent with a given left-right position and details 
can to some extent be worked out midterm. Meanwhile having a cred-
ible left-right pitch is important because it is procedurally rational for 
voters to think in those terms.35
accordingly, our assumption is that the median voter prefers cen-
ter-right party b if center-left party a’s policies lack credibility. the 
assumption holds even if party a’s policies are closer to the median 
voter’s ideal policy position—i.e., the median voter would have pre-
ferred a’s policies had they been credible. in other words, the median 
voter fears a possible crisis more than the implementation of party b’s 
proposals. We show that losing the election is worse for party a than 
locating at the constraint.36
in formal terms, parties a and b compete along a single issue di-
mension. Party a’s position is denoted by a, and party b’s position by 
b. the parties are uncertain about the position of the median voter, m, 
but share the same cumulative distribution function for this random 
variable, F(m), with probability density function f(m). assuming prox-
imity voting or that voters vote for the party nearest to their position, 
then for a ≤ b, the probability that a wins the election is F((a + b)/2): 
those to the left of (a + b)/2 vote for a. the expression gives the prob-
ability that the median is in this group and hence a majority vote for 
a. if a ≤ b, the probability that b wins is 1  - F((a + b)/2). if a > b, the 
probability that a wins is 1 - F((a + b)/2) and the probability that b 
wins is F((a + b)/2).) to make the analysis as tractable as possible we 
assume specifically that the distribution function is logistic, with mean 
µ and shape parameter s, so:
F((a + b)/2) = 1/(1 + e-x) = F(x)
where
x = ((a+b)/2 - µ)/s)
and
f(x) = e-x /(1 + e-x)2.
note that the variance of the logistic distribution is π2s2/3. in the equa-
tion below, further assumptions are that party i’s utility declines linearly 
34 simon 1985.
35 downs 1957.
36 Possibly a more realistic assumption is that costs to party a’s electoral chances taper in gradually 
as it moves further and further to the left of the constraint, but a model incorporating this idea gives 
essentially the same picture as the one we present.
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with distance from its policy ideal point, which is also denoted by i; so 
parties are assumed to be risk neutral. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that a< b. Parties aim to maximize their expected payoff from 
policy over one electoral round. For instance for a this is measured by 
the probability that a wins times a’s utility from implementing its pol-
icy plus the probability that b wins times a’s utility from b’s policy.37 
hence for a given position of J, j, i aims to maximize:
ui(i , j) = -i - iG(x) - j - i (1-G(x))
with respect to i, where
G(x) = F(x) for i ≤ j and (1 – F(x)) for i > j.
similarly, the expected policy outcome is given by
o(i, j) = iG(x) + j(1-G(x)),
so that it is a convex combination of the positions taken by the parties 
such that
i < o(i , j) < j, where i < j.
to establish a baseline, suppose that there is no constraint on the 
position parties adopt. Given the outcome is a convex combination, it 
is easy to see that positions a* and b* form a nash equilibrium of the 
game only if a ≤ a* < b* ≤ b. if not, at least one party can get a better 
outcome by moving in the direction of its ideal point, given that for i < j, 
o(i , j) ∈ (i , j) and for i = j, o(i , j) = i = j.
We assume that a < µ < b and, more specifically, that a < µ - 2s and 
b > µ + 2s. the first assumption is plausible if it is accepted that the 
social democratic party’s core constituency is the (organized) working 
classes and the public sector, as often assumed in the debate on the 
effects of globalization. similarly, it is reasonable in this context to as-
sume µ < b. because s is an increasing function of the variance of the 
distribution over the position of the median voter, the specific assump-
tion amounts to the assertion that the standard deviation of the median 
is relatively low compared to the distance between parties’ policy ideal 
points. With modern opinion polling, this seems plausible. in online 
appendix 1,38 which contains technicalities concerning equilibria of 
the model, we show that if there is no constraint on the parties there 
37 our conclusions are not substantially altered if we add a component of utility due to rents from 
winning office; see Wittman 1983.
38 online appendices are available from the authors at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ezrow/.
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is a unique nash equilibrium at a* = µ - 2s and b* = µ + 2s.39 For the 
unconstrained case, we denote a’s and b’s best-response functions as 
ra(b) and rb(a) respectively.
suppose there is a constraint at c, µ - 2s < c < µ + 2s, so that the 
constraint is effective on a, but not on b. For a < c and b ≥ c, assume 
a always loses the election, whereas for a = c and b ≥ c, assume a has a 
strictly positive probability of winning. then if a < c, b* = b, because b 
can win at its policy ideal point for sure. then for any a < c,
ua(a , b) < ua(c , rb(c)),
because the outcome from the strategies {a , b} is b, whereas the out-
come from {c , rb(c)} is to the left of b and to the right of c, since rb(c) 
≤ b. thus a is better off locating at the constraint than anywhere to 
the left of it and the constrained equilibrium is (a*’, b*’) = (c , rb(c)). 
the technical details are in online appendix 1, but the intuition is eas-
ily grasped from Figure 1.
 in Figure 1, ra(b) and rb(a) show how each party would respond 
to the other’s position in order to maximize its utility if unconstrained. 
these functions intersect once at the unconstrained nash equilibrium 
(µ - 2s, µ + 2s). if the constraint is imposed, a is never better off locat-
ing to the left of c than at c. if it locates at c, b’s response is rb(c). if b 
locates there, we show that a’s best response is c: a moves as far as pos-
sible to the left without violating the constraint. under the constraint 
the corner solution (c , rb(c)) is the unique nash equilibrium. the 
arrows indicate the way that a’s equilibrium position moves as a conse-
quence of the constraint. notice b ≥ rb(c) > µ + 2s, i.e., the knock-on 
effect of the constraint is that b moves toward its policy ideal. the 
intuition is that at (c , µ + 2s) b gets a better outcome if a wins than 
it would have got at (µ - 2s , µ + 2s) in the unconstrained case. b 
trades some of this advantage in by moving nearer its policy ideal. For 
relatively small shifts of this sort, b’s chances of winning decline only 
slightly while it significantly improves its payoff if it wins and imple-
ments its policy. b moves to the right, but because of the slope of the 
reaction function, it does not move as much as a.
Figure 2 summarizes the various possibilities. in the first scenario—
as shown in Figure 2(a)—with a relatively right median voter, any glo-
balization constraint would be ineffective. since the equilibrium posi-
tions of the parties are both to the right of the constraint, globalization 
has no impact on either party’s policy platform. When the constraint 
39 cf. brams and Merrill 1983.
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is effective, both parties are predicted to move to the right compared 
to the unconstrained case (see Figure 2(b)), though b will not move 
as much as a. Whether a given constraint is effective depends on the 
expected position of the median voter and the degree of uncertainty 
over this position.
Many of the systems we wish to apply our results to are not effec-
tive two-party ones and they do not have competition between well-
established center left and center right coalitions. in a Wittman-style 
model adams and samuel Merrill40 show that in a first-past-the-post 
system three-party equilibriums are divergent and symmetric around 
the expected position of the median, with the center party located at 
40 adams and Merrill 2006.
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that position. allowing for coalitions and strategic voting, computa-
tions suggest that if they exist, equilibriums in three-party competition 
over a single dimension are divergent.41 in addition, recent results on 
multiparty competition where voters’ utility functions reflect partisan 
biases as well as party positions have divergent equilibriums and par-
ties moving in consort to the left or right.42 accordingly, we conjecture 
that in three-party Wittman-style models and models incorporating 
valence, the impact of imposing a constraint on the left—if the con-
straint is effective—would be similar to that in our model.
41 roemer 2001, 281–96.
42 adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005, 52–70.
figure 2 
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if a country is more exposed to global economic forces, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the globalization constraint will be further to 
the right. the constraint arises partly as a result of the threat to with-
draw capital investment or through short-term speculative flows mov-
ing out of the economy.43 the larger a nation’s exposure, the greater 
the consequences if the threat were carried out. this in turn will lead 
to larger electoral costs for any party that is deemed by the electorate 
to have brought about this effect, and more pressure will exist for it to 
conform to market views about policy. specifically, this pressure will 
generally be in a rightward direction if a party is directly subject to the 
constraint. hence we test the following hypotheses, allowing for the 
interaction between the positions of the constraint and the median:
—h1. the greater the degree to which an economy is exposed to 
economic globalization, the further to the right political parties in that 
system will locate.
—h2. the further to the right the median voter is expected to be, the 
further to the right political parties will locate.
Moreover,
—h3.the further to the right the median voter is expected to be, 
the lower the rightward impact of economic globalization on political 
parties.
these hypotheses can be tested if the statistical model for party posi-
tions includes a measure of economic globalization (expected to have 
a positive coefficient), a measure of the median voter’s expected po-
sition (which should have a positive coefficient), and a multiplicative 
interaction between these two variables (expected to have a negative 
coefficient).
 From the formal model it also follows that:
—h4. the more exposed an economy is to economic globalization, 
the further to the right parties of both the left and the right will locate, 
but the impact will be greater on parties of the left.
reSearch deSign
our data set is a pool where the cases comprise political party/years for 
180 parties over the period from 1973 to 2002. For reasons discussed 
below, we use eurobarometer data to operationalize the position of the 
median voter, so we are limited to parties in countries that were member 
43 rogowski 2003.
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states of the european union by 2002.44 because member states en-
tered the eu at various times, we do not have relevant information 
on voter position for all parties for all years. the parties included are 
those for which information is available from the cmp and covers all 
parties that held seats in the legislature in each relevant country/year.45 
the countries included in the analysis are austria, belgium, denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great britain, Greece, ireland, italy, lux-
embourg, the netherlands, Portugal, spain, and sweden.
the dependent variable
cmp data allows us to map party positions over the entire time period 
and for all of the countries. cmp estimates should be reliable and ac-
curate statements about party positions at the time of elections because 
they are often the result of intense intraparty debates. these measures 
are generally consistent with those from other party-positioning stud-
ies, such as those based upon expert placements, citizen perceptions 
of parties’ positions, and parliamentary voting analyses, which provide 
additional confidence in the longitudinal and cross-national reliability 
of the estimates.46
 the methods used to map cmp-data-only party policy positions are 
described and debated at length elsewhere, but deserve a brief review.47 
Policy positions are characterized by the quantitative examination 
of party stances on policies on the basis of content analysis of elec-
tion programs.48 individual coders isolate quasi-sentences in a party’s 
policy program and pair them with policy categories (e.g., education, 
defense, law and order, and morality) using a preestablished common 
classification scheme. the classification scheme is made up of fifty-six 
categories and the percentages of each category provide the basis for 
estimating the policy priorities of a party. the left-right ideological 
scores for parties’ policy programs, position, range from -100 (extreme 
left) to +100 (extreme right). using relevant questions from the cmp, 
we extend our approach to statements on welfare policy as part of our 
robustness tests.
44 schmitt and scholz 2005.
45 budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006.
46 see hearl 2001; Mcdonald and Mendes 2001; cf. laver, benoit, and Garry 2003.
47 For a more thorough description of the coding process, see budge et al. 2001, appendix 2. de-
bate exists over which approach (e.g., expert opinions, citizen perceptions, or codings of manifestos) 
is the most accurate for measuring party policy positions. indeed a special issue of Electoral Studies is 
dedicated to analyzing the trade-offs that accompany each of these approaches. Marks 2007; see also 
benoit and laver 2006, chap. 3: 88–122. We rely on cmp data because the data set covers a longer time 
period than the alternatives.
48 budge et al. 2001.
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the main independent variableS
in this section, we discuss key independent variables, median voter 
position, and economic globalization. We concentrate on questions 
of measurement and explore the issue of the possible endogeneity of 
these variables in a subsequent section. the longitudinal measure of 
the median voter position is based on public opinion and derives from 
eurobarometer surveys dating from 1973, the first year that the left-
right self-placement item appears on the eurobarometer survey, until 
2002. the surveys ask approximately 2,000 respondents in each coun-
try to place themselves on a 1–10 left-right ideological scale.49 the 
mean of respondents’ self-placements, voter_ position, is our measure of 
the expected position of the median, which is appropriate since the 
distribution of self-placement is typically unimodal and relatively sym-
metric.50
the correlations between the various indicators used in the lit-
erature for economic globalization are generally quite high, which is 
conducive to constructing an index. such an index is also helpful to 
avoid problems with multicollinearity. While axel dreher constructs 
separate indices of economic, social, and political globalization that he 
then combines into an overall index,51 we are most interested in his 
economic index, economic_ globalization. in it the underlying indicators 
are a country’s trade flows, portfolio and direct investment, tariff and 
invisible barriers to trade, and capital controls. after normalizing the 
indicators, the weights assigned to them are derived from first principal 
component analysis, so that the index captures as much of the variation 
in the indicators as possible.52
49 specifically, the eurobarometer surveys ask, “in political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the 
right.’ how would you place your views on this scale?” empirical analyses suggest that with the excep-
tion of belgium, Germany, and ireland, eurobarometer respondents’ left-right self-placements are 
comparable cross-nationally (i.e., respondents’ self-placements are meaningfully related to the prefer-
ences along specific dimensions of policy debate); huber 1989. We re-estimated the parameters of 
the basic model specification excluding belgium, Germany, and ireland. these parameter estimates, 
available from the authors upon request, strengthened support of our substantive conclusions.
50 in our data set, the correlation over country years between voter position and a measure making 
a median correction for grouped data is 0.969 (n = 100). the results using this measure are similar to 
those reported here and are available from the authors.
51 an early attempt at index construction is the Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization index, 
but the weightings of the factors entering the index are arbitrarily chosen and potentially inferior to 
weightings chosen so that the overall index captures as much of the information in its components as 
possible. Kearney and Foreign Policy 2006; lockwood 2004, 515; heshmati 2006; dreher 2006.
52 When constructing their globalization index, Warwick university’s center for the study of 
Globalization 2008 controls for such structural factors as a country’s size and geographical location, 
statistically stripping out structural effects so as to focus on nations’ policies toward globalization; 
lockwood 2004, 511–12. this is not appropriate for our purposes because we are interested in the 
impact of both past policy and a country’s fixed characteristics on the current policies of its political 
parties.
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an econometric analySiS of the conditional effectS of  
globalization and voter poSition on party policy platformS
regression 1 in table 1 tests the third hypothesis that the impact of 
globalization on party platforms is conditional on the expected posi-
tion of the median voter. it includes both economic_globalization and 
voter_position (for which the theory suggests positive coefficients) and 
their interaction, voter_positionXecon_glob (with an expected negative 
coefficient). before turning to the substance of the results, we consider 
some issues regarding estimation.
 the models have a lagged dependent variable and are estimated us-
ing fixed effects. hence, prevposition is the party’s position on the left-
right scale at the previous election.53 the regressions include the lagged 
dependent variable because party adjustment to electoral and economic 
forces is not likely to be immediate, so dynamics are of interest. it is ap-
propriate to include fixed effects because of the need to eliminate bias 
due to the effect of unmeasured variables that are not strictly exoge-
nous, i.e., not uncorrelated with other explanatory variables for all time 
periods.54 For example, we cannot control for party policy goals be-
cause we lack a plausible proxy measure for them. although they might 
be expected to be relatively stable, they could correlate with the ex-
pected position of the median because they may change with the views 
of a party’s core support groups (which might also affect the median).
While fixed effects should help avoid problems with estimates of 
the impact of the median, the inclusion of the lagged dependent vari-
able generates problems with the fixed-effects estimator. besides los-
ing information on between variation, carrying out the fixed-effects 
transformation in a model with lagged dependent variables induces 
a correlation between the (transformed) lagged dependent variable 
and the (transformed) error terms. thus the fixed-effects estimates 
are biased. nathanial beck and Jonathan Katz discuss the advisability 
of using alternative estimators for lagged dependent variable models. 
their Monte carlo simulations suggest that the anderson-hsiao iV 
53 to preserve degrees of freedom, we use cmp scores for years prior to 1973 (the first year we use 
for the remainder of our data) when calculating prevposition. the substantive conclusions are un-
changed when we omit this variable from the model specification.
54 We reject the use of the random-effects estimator because we do not believe the necessary strict 
endogeneity assumption that justifies its use is satisfied and because we are mainly interested in the 
impact of globalization, which is not time invariant or even slow changing and which would be a 
problem under fixed effects; Wooldridge 2006, 497. the use of a hausman test to help decide whether 
to use the fixed- or random-effects estimator is inappropriate here because the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable in the model means neither estimator is consistent under the null that the errors 
are uncorrelated with all other independent variables.
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estimator generally performs worse on mean squared errors than esti-
mating the fixed-effects model under ordinary least squares. We follow 
their advice: if there are twenty or more time periods, as in our data, it 
is best to ignore the inconsistency problem.55
the first difference transformation is an alternative for eliminating 
unobserved effects. adams, haupt, and stoll56 use this transformation 
to help address problems of autocorrelation and they also include the 
differenced lagged dependent variable. however, in the presence of a 
55 beck and Katz 2004, 15. they also discuss the Kiviet estimator, but our panel is unbalanced and 
so this could not be used.
56 adams, haupt, and stoll 2009; cf. haupt 2010.
table 1
globalization and party poSition: alternative meaSureS  
of globalization
 Regression
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Position Position Position Position Position
prevposition .176 .179 .188 .172 .163
 (3.57)*** (3.34)*** (3.84)*** (3.32)*** (3.58)***
voter_position 27.2  9.48 4.57 35.9
 (2.91)***  (1.74)* (1.42) (2.90)***
economic_globalization 1.78 .0951   
 (2.68)*** (1.44)   
voter_positionXecon_glob –.346    
 (2.71)***    
totaltrade   .422  
   (1.57)  
totaltradeXvoter_position   –.0939  
   (1.67)*  
fdi    2.41 
    (2.07)** 
fdiXvoter_position    –.476 
    (2.08)** 
quinn_all     15.8
     (2.75)***
quinn_allXvoter_position     –3.03
     (2.81)***
constant –141 –8.86 –45.3 –25.1 –190
observations 617 790 617 566 617
number of parties 138 146 138 131 138
r-squared (overall) 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.38
robust, clustered t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p ≤ .01 ; ** p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10, two-tailed tests
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lagged dependent variable, differencing is likely to have substantially 
more bias than the fixed-effects estimator.57 unless otherwise stated, 
we use the fixed-effects estimator with robust clustered standard er-
rors58 because it is generally advisable to allow both heteroskedasticity 
and possible contemporaneous correlation across errors in cross sec-
tions.59
returning to the substance of table 1, regression 1, the estimates 
support the theoretical predictions. the coefficient on economic_global-
ization is positive (in support of h1), the coefficient on voter_position 
is also positive (in line with h2), and the coefficient on the interaction 
term voter_positionXecon_glob is negative (as h3 expects).60 Figure 3 
shows the estimated coefficient on economic_globalization (with a 95 
percent confidence interval) conditional on the value of voter_position. 
interpreting the results presented in table 1, regression 1, the ef-
fect of globalization is highest when voter_position is at its minimum 
value of 4.31. a shift from the minimum value of economic_globaliza-
tion (46.35) to its maximum value (96.68) is expected to move a party 
14.6 units. in light of the standard deviation of this variable, 21.5, this 
is a substantively large effect. Figure 3 shows that the coefficient on 
economic_globalization is positive and significantly different from zero 
only when the electorate holds left political preferences. indeed, for 
values of voter_position greater than about 5.7, the results suggest that 
as economic_globalization increases parties actually shift significantly to 
the left.
hypothesis 4 suggests that globalization has a greater impact on 
parties of the left than on parties on the right. the dummy left takes on 
the value 1 for parties coded as belonging to social democratic or com-
munist families as classified by the cmp. after reestimating the core 
model and including two- and three-way interactions between left, 
voter_position, and economic_globalization, Figure 4 plots coefficients 
on economic_globalization for the range of values of voter_position for 
parties of the left and parties of the right. For parties of the left, the 
picture is similar to that of Figure 3: only if voter_position is relatively 
far to the left (around 4.8) are parties of the left pushed significantly 
to the right. For other parties economic_globalization does not have a 
significant effect on any value of voter_position, although as predicted 
57 Wooldridge 2006, 492.
58 if robust errors seem advisable in estimations using panel data with fixed effects, it is best to 
cluster on the cross-sectional variable; stock and Watson 2006. there was, however, little difference 
to the results.
59 beck and Katz 2004, 4.
60 lagging economic globalization makes little difference. results available from authors.
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the central estimate of its effect declines as voter_position increases. 
consistent with hypothesis 4, the effects of economic globalization 
are indeed more marked for parties of the left, conditional on the me-
dian’s position.61
Much of the debate on globalization has focused on scandinavia and 
the social democratic left there. Perhaps counterintuitively, these are 
not the parties that our model identifies as most likely to be affected. 
although the scandinavian countries are relatively open, their median 
voters are relatively centrist compared with our data’s grand mean of 
5.48 (denmark 5.59, Finland 5.78, and sweden 5.31). italy (4.81) and 
spain (4.67), however, have the combination of relatively open econo-
mies with left-wing electorates. For these southern european cases, we 
predict globalization will generate significant pressures on the left. to 
illustrate, we consider the spanish national election of 2000, the most 
recent for which the cmp provides data. the most significant party on 
61 We have reestimated the parameters of the basic model specification stratifying observations 
based on party family. although we lose (many) degrees of freedom when we estimate the parameters 
for these models, the estimates are in the expected direction across families, with the exception of 
green parties. results available from the authors.
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the effect of economic globalization on poSition,  
conditional on voter poSition.
beta economic globalization                      lower 95
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the left in spain is the spanish socialist Workers’ Party (pSoe), which 
has governed since the 2004 election. the cmp registers the pSoe in 
2000 far to the left (-20.49), which is extreme when compared to par-
ties of the left across all of the countries in the data (-14.16). that 
same year spain’s voter_position is also relatively far to the left at 4.86 
and its economy is highly globalized (83.97 compared to 73.9 for the 
average of the all countries) with an annual rate of increase of 2.05 
figure 4 
the effect of economic globalization on poSition,  
conditional on voter poSition, for partieS of the left  
and for other partieS.
Fixed effects; robust clustered t-statistics in parenthesis, n = 617
the underlying model is:
positiont = –145 + .17 prevpositiont + 22.3 voter_positiont + 1.05 economic_globalizationt
           (3.42)                   (1.65)                        (1.17)
–.209 voter_positionXecon_globt + 2.06 leftXecon_globt + 14.2 leftXvoter_positiont
         (1.23)                                 (1.53)                         (0.74)
–.382 leftXvoter_positionXecon_globt + et
         (1.45) 
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530 world politicS 
points on the globalization index. based on the model specification 
underlying Figure 4, the prediction is that the pSoe will be pushed to 
the right at an annual rate of around 0.47 points. on the surface, this 
seems like only a modest change, but if continued through the rest of 
the decade, such a push would have turned the pSoe from a relatively 
extreme member of the left family to a moderate one. We note here 
that tracing the process of party-position shifts requires detailed case 
studies beyond the scope of this paper.62
 as argued in the introduction, models that do not include the posi-
tion of the median and its interaction with economic globalization are 
likely to be misspecified. to highlight this observation, regression 2 
(table 1) excludes voter_position and the interaction term voter_posi-
tionXecon_glob. Economic_globalization now has a positive coefficient 
but it is insignificant even at the 90 percent level. the second model 
thus underestimates63 the effect of globalization when the median voter 
is located to the left and fails to capture the way the effect of globaliza-
tion is conditional on what the median voter wants.
 a relevant issue is whether dimensions of economic globalization re-
lating to trade flows, financial flows, and restrictions on financial flows 
have similar effects to those reported in regression 1. in table 1, regres-
sion 3, totaltrade is a measure of imports plus exports as reported by the 
World bank development indicators; in regression 4, fdi is inward and 
outward foreign direct investment also reported by the World bank; 
and in regression 5, quinn_all is Quinn’s measure of all restrictions on 
international financial flows based on imf country reports on exchange 
restrictions.64 in each case the globalization measures have the expected 
positive sign and their interactions with voter position are negative. 
david brady and ryan denniston show that results on the effects of 
globalization on manufacturing are quite sensitive to how globalization 
is measured. our results do not seem that sensitive, although the ef-
fects of trade are less significant than those of investment and financial 
flows.65
62 the pSoe administration in spain is currently under considerable pressure to retrench. accord-
ing to the Financial Times (May 12, 2010), pSoe Prime Minister Jose luis rodriguez zapatero “had 
no choice but to undergo the welfare-state equivalent of trial by ordeal,” cutting civil service pay by 5 
percent and public spending by an additional 1.5 percent of gross domestic product.
63 in table 1, regression 2, when economic_globalization varies from its minimum to maximum 
value, parties move 4.79 units to the right.
64 Quinn and toyoda 2008.
65 brady and denniston 2006. Quinn’s measure of restrictions on financial flows gives results simi-
lar to dreher’s (2006) index economic_restrictions, with which it has a bivariate correlation of around 
0.7 (n = 645).
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robuStneSS checkS
We test the robustness of table 1’s results to address possible concerns 
about endogeneity and causal structure, limitations on the country 
sample, and the error structure.
cauSal pathwayS and endogeneity
When estimating models of party position, there is a possibility that 
globalization and voter positions are endogenous. in the adserà and 
boix model66 the openness of the economy is endogenous to party com-
petition because governments respond to the median’s views on trade 
and the welfare state. some social democratic politicians attempt to 
persuade the median voter that there is no alternative to restructuring 
the public sector in a globalized world, as illustrated by brown’s Man-
sion house speech quoted above. in the online appendix we reestimate 
regression 1 using a two-stage least squares regression (2SlS) estimator 
for panel data with instrumental variables (iv). We instrumented eco-
nomic_globalization and voter_position. the results are consistent with 
those in the text, allowing for loss of efficiency when employing instru-
ments and for loss of degrees of freedom due to the construction of 
instruments.
if globalization moves the median voter to the left—reflecting the 
desire for compensation67—the results of regression 1 would not fully 
capture the impact of globalization. under this scenario, we would 
capture the causal pathway whereby the constraint pushes parties to 
the right, but would not capture the effects on party position due to 
globalization pushing the median to the left. on the other hand, if 
voters believe that certain social democratic policies are infeasible, they 
may cease to find them desirable and move to the right, although this 
would be an example of sour-grapes thinking outside the mainstream 
of rational choice.
theoretically, we do not think our results depend on the validity of 
the compensation thesis. We model policy pledges instead of policy 
implementation. demand for compensation from organized interests 
may well present problems for policy implementation. even if global-
ization does influence some voter preferences, it does not follow that 
it will necessarily affect party competition. if globalization opens up 
markets in the south for relatively capital-intensive products from the 
north while the north imports more labor-intensive products from 
66 adserà and boix 2002.
67 rodrik 1997; Garrett 1998.
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the south, the stolper-samuelson theorem implies unskilled labor in 
rich, developed economies will lose relative to capital. thus the groups 
at risk are quite likely to be among the unskilled working classes lo-
cated to the left of the median. if this is so, globalization might shift 
social democratic parties’ core support group to the left while leaving 
the median unchanged. suppose core support groups influence party 
policy preferences. our model suggests that their position determines 
which side of the expected median the parties locate, not how far from 
it they locate; so any impact globalization has on social democratic par-
ties’ core support should not affect our results. using individual-level 
survey data, hellwig68 shows that globalization tends to reduce the 
level of responsibility for good economic performance ascribed by the 
electorate to government. even if globalization causes unemployment 
and insecurity among some groups, this finding might suggest that the 
median would not necessarily respond by moving to the left and de-
manding compensatory policies.
Fortunately, it is possible to address these considerations empirically. 
in modeling the median’s preferences we control for the possible in-
fluence of globalization. We also allow for the possible influence of 
governing parties on the median.69 to allow for potential endogeneity 
we estimate the model using 2SlS/iv. We do not find any significant 
evidence for a causal pathway from economic globalization to party 
positions via the median.
Sample limitationS
a limitation of our study imposed by requirements for data on the po-
sition of the median voter is that it is confined to eu member states. 
eu membership constrains the range of positions that parties adopt on 
issues where the eu has competency.70 however, reduction in range 
does not imply pressure to move to the right; it would be implausible to 
claim that eu pressure is in this direction for all member states and all 
issues. nevertheless it might still be argued that our findings are driven 
not so much by globalization as by intra-eu trade. We calculate total 
trade with other eu member states as a proportion of gross domestic 
product, EU_open; it has only a moderate positive correlation with eco-
nomic_globalization (0.12, n = 906). in web appendix 2 we show that 
68 hellwig 2001 and forthcoming.
69 We obtained similar results for this average weighted by seat share in the government and for the 
average position of all parties in the legislature.
70 dorussen and nanou 2006; nanou 2009.
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EU_open and its multiplicative interaction with voter_position are not 
significant when added to regression 1. the coefficients and confidence 
intervals for other variables are stable. While we need to be cautious 
about the external validity of our results beyond the eu context, this 
indicates they are likely to hold up.71
lag Structure and autocorrelation
in the data set, we use cross sections corresponding to years. For many 
parties however, in a given year there are no observations on their posi-
tions because no election was held. indeed there is very little variance in 
some cross sections.72 one consequence of this data structure is that the 
prevposition variable does not refer to position a fixed number of years 
ago (as it does in standard lagged dependent variable specifications), 
but rather to position at the last election (where time since the last elec-
tion varies across cases). in results reported in online appendix 2 we 
allow for the possibility that this affects the coefficient on prevposition. 
as expected, we find this coefficient attenuates with time since the last 
election. because this makes little difference to the substance of our 
results, we generally use the simpler specification, as in regression 1.
another issue around dynamics is that the residuals from regression 
1 show evidence of autocorrelation. although including the lagged de-
pendent variable is implicit in any response to problems of autocor-
relation in the residuals, it appears not to eliminate the problem here.73 
results reported in web appendix 2 reestimate regression 1 allowing 
for an ar(1) process in the residuals by using the Prais-Winsten trans-
formation. the substantive results remain unchanged. other models 
reported in this article are estimated without the correction. another 
method for dealing with autocorrelation and trending in variables is to 
difference them, as advocated by adams, haupt, and stoll.74 in online 
appendix 2 we estimate a model similar to regression 1, but with the 
variables differenced. the results are qualitatively similar to those in 
regression 1: increases in globalization generate changes in party posi-
tion but the effects are mediated by shifts by the median to the right.
71 We could have included more cases, such as cases outside the eu, by using the Kim and Ford-
ing 2003 measure of mean voter position based on cmp estimates of party positions and their known 
vote shares. We use cmp data to estimate party positions and believe there is a potential circularity 
when using a proxy for a variable on the right-hand side of the equation that is also based on the same 
party-positions data.
72 this is another reason we did not use random-effects estimators.
73 beck and Katz 2004.
74 adams, haupt, and stoll 2009.
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party SyStem effectS75
iversen and soskice’s analysis76 suggests that the effects we are examin-
ing may be contingent on whether a nation has a proportional electoral 
system (pr). Focusing on class coalitions they deduce that in pr sys-
tems the middle classes are more likely to ally with the poor, leading 
to a greater emphasis on redistribution. this suggests that on the one 
hand, the (conditional) effects of globalization should be smaller in pr 
systems because they exhibit more path dependency in maintaining re-
distribution. on the other hand, in non-pr systems like Great britain 
where the middle class is more likely to ally with the rich, globalization 
should have a greater effect. thus far our empirical analyses do not 
control for electoral-system effects because controlling for fixed effects 
removes both the impact of the electoral system and that of associated 
forms of institutional path dependence around the welfare state. nev-
ertheless, we go some way toward modelling them explicitly.
 in table 2 we reestimate our model and stratify the sample into 
proportional (regression 6) and disproportional (regression 7) systems. 
France, Great britain, Greece, and spain are coded as disproportional. 
in both subsamples the coefficient on the interaction is negative. it is 
not significant in disproportional systems, but this may well be due to 
loss of degrees of freedom when the sample is split. We note that the 
estimate for pr systems (-.30) is less than half of the estimate for dis-
proportional systems (-.69), which suggests that the effect we predict is 
more important in disproportional systems.
because electoral systems influence the number of parties, we ad-
dress the issue by stratifying by number of effective parties. to calcu-
late the number of effective parties we use the reciprocal of Keefer’s 
herfindahl index of party concentration, based on seat shares in the 
legislature in the country/year to which the observation belongs. the 
sample is split based on whether the system approximates a two-party 
one (effective number of parties ≤ 2.5, regression 9) or not (regression 
8). leaving aside significance levels on the grounds that regression 9 
is based on a much smaller number of observations than regression 8, 
there is some evidence from comparing coefficients that the impact of 
globalization is greater for the pure two-party cases.
welfare State and taXation
Much of the globalization debate is specifically concerned with the 
welfare state. With the cmp database it is possible to construct the var-
75 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to consider these effects.
76 iversen and soskice 2006.
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iable welfare, which is equal to the percentage of sentences mentioning 
welfare limitation minus the percentage of sentences mentioning wel-
fare expansion.77 notice that the higher the value of welfare, the further 
to the right a party’s policies on this issue. the correlation between 
welfare and position is around 0.45 (n = 909); welfare is not just a proxy 
for left-right position. in table 3, regression 10, the dependent vari-
able is welfare and we include the lagged value of welfare, prevwelfare. 
We expect voter_position and economic_globalization to have positive 
coefficients, indicating parties tend to emphasize welfare state limi-
tation more as the median voter moves to the right and as pressures 
from globalization increase. We expect the coefficient on the interac-
tion voter_positionXecon_glob to be negative, since our theory suggests 
if the median voter is far enough to the right globalization will not 
be constraining. these expectations are supported and the results are 
77 the cmp defines a welfare variable that adds mentions of social justice to sentences mentioning 
welfare expansion. While this correlates at about -0.8 (n = 909) with our measure, we think it is bet-
ter to include welfare limitation and do not think that all concern for social justice relates directly to 
welfare provision.
table 2
eStimateS for different electoral and party SyStemS
 Regression
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Position Position 
   (Effective (Effective 
Dependent Variable Position Position Number of Number of   
(Subsample) (Proportional) (Disproportional) Parties > 2.5) Parties < 2.5)
prevposition .18 .16 .17 .082
 (3.30)*** (1.34) (3.05)*** (0.90)
voter_position 24.4 47.1 29.1 72.7
 (2.19)** (1.51) (3.06)*** (0.86)
economic_globalization 1.52 3.48 1.85 5.71
 (1.93)* (1.55) (2.72)*** (0.88)
voter_positionXecon_glob –.30 –.69 –.35 –1.11
 (2.02)** (1.49) (2.74)*** (0.97)
constant –127 –243 –153 –371
 (2.13)** (1.62) (3.09)*** (0.79)
observations 477 140 530 87
number of parties 102 36 125 45
r-squared (overall) 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.09
robust clustered t-statistics are in parentheses; *** p ≤ .01 ; ** p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10, two-tailed tests
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parallel to those in regression 1.78 similar to the findings shown in Fig-
ure 3, only when the median voter is relatively far to the left is the 
coefficient on economic_globalization positive, indicating that globaliza-
tion pushes parties to advocate welfare state retrenchment under these 
circumstances. in this instance, though, the effect of globalization is 
not significant for low values of voter_position.
 Gøsta esping-anderson characterizes welfare states as social demo-
cratic (e.g., sweden), conservative (e.g., Germany), or liberal (e.g., the 
u.s. and the u.K.). Powerful parts of the business community favor 
the liberal model. Parties in systems with other kinds of welfare states 
might be expected to pick up ideas about liberal reform by diffusion 
on top of any constraints they are subject to due to globalization.79 us-
ing esping-anderson’s coding of types of welfare capitalism, we create 
dummy variables soc_dem_world, cons_world, and lib_world indicating 
which cluster a country belongs to.80 inclusion of these variables allows 
us to further demonstrate robustness to institutional differences. since 
the dummies are constant over time, their coefficients cannot be esti-
mated using fixed effects. to address this issue, thomas Plümper and 
Vera troeger81 propose a fixed-effects vector decomposition method 
(referred to in stata as “xtfevd”) to estimate the impact of unchanging 
or slowly changing variables in a model of a panel that also includes 
fixed effects. We use this estimator in regression 11.82 the excluded 
dummy in it is lib_world. the positive coefficients on soc_dem_world 
and cons_world indicate additional stress on welfare state retrenchment 
by parties in these clusters, in line with debates on the influence of the 
liberal welfare state model.
according to the varieties of capitalism approach, in cmes, parties’ 
policies on welfare should be less subject to pressure to move to the 
right due to globalization. We use hall and daniel Gingerich’s overall 
index of coordination, coordinated_capitalism to test this, expecting a 
negative coefficient. because index values are time invariant, we use 
the xtfevd estimator again. as shown in regression 12, the coefficient 
78 the overall r2 here is lower than in regression 1. For any given party, welfare tends to be more 
volatile than position, which is to be expected given that it is constructed from a much smaller number 
of indicators.
79 esping-andersen 1999; cf. brooks 2005.
80 he does not explicitly categorize spain or Portugal, but from information in the text they appear 
to belong in the conservative cluster and are coded accordingly; esping-andersen 2009. For luxem-
bourg and Greece there was no information, so observations on these countries are dropped.
81 Plümper and troeger 2007.
82 currently xtfevd returns robust standard errors exactly 100 times greater than the correct esti-
mate (author communication with troeger). in table 3 we recalculated t-values and significance levels 
reported by stata to allow for this.
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is actually positive, suggesting more pressure on parties in coordinated 
systems.83
corporatism is another persistent institutional feature of some states 
important to the globalization debate. Following Garrett,84 we expect 
that the greater the degree of corporatism, the lower the impact of glo-
balization on parties belonging to the left family. regression 13 tests 
this hypothesis specifically in relation to welfare. because the hypoth-
esis concerns a particular party family, it includes the dummy variable 
left for parties belonging to the social democratic and communist party 
families. it also includes a measure of corporatism derived from arendt 
lijphart’s measure of interest-group pluralism, lijphart_corporatism,85 
and the interaction between these two variables, left X l_corp. We use 
the xtfed estimator because the left dummy and the measure of cor-
poratism are time invariant. if corporatism allows parties of the left 
to locate nearer their policy ideal, we would expect a significant nega-
tive coefficient on the interaction left X lijp_corp. While the idea that 
corporatism matters is supported in relation to welfare policy, we do 
not find that corporatism allowed left parties to adopt positions nearer 
their policy ideal on the general left-right spectrum.
 the coefficients on the three key variables—voter_position, economic_
globalization, and voter_positionXecon_glob—are quite stable across the 
three specifications in regressions 11, 12, and 13 (table 3), indicating 
that the hypothesized effects are robust to controlling for the type of 
welfare state and variety of capitalism. these results are not necessar-
ily inconsistent with the mixed findings for the effect of globalization 
on welfare spending.86 Welfare spending has been shown to be rela-
tively stable with persistent differences between left and right parties 
in growth in social spending when globalization is pronounced. due to 
pressure for compensation or pressure to maintain distinct labor skills, 
the overall impact of globalization may sometimes be an increase in 
welfare state provision. changes in party platform do not necessarily 
translate immediately or mechanically into more austere welfare state 
83 hall and Gingerich 2009, 470. results are similar using their separate indices for coordination of 
corporate governance and labor relations, with positive coefficients on each variable.
84 Garrett 1998.
85 lijphart 1999, 177. in technical terms we standardized and inverted lijphart’s scale. though 
lijphart clearly contrasts consensus democracies (known to score high on corporatism measures) with 
those based on interest-group pluralism, whether this is a valid measure of corporatism may be que-
ried. in fact lijphart’s scale correlated reasonably highly with other indices such as Kenworthy’s—at 
about 0.63 (n = 413); Kenworthy 2003. the advantage of using our measure is that it is available for a 
larger number of countries than alternatives, which often exclude spain, Portugal, luxembourg, and 
ireland.
86 Pierson 2006; Potrafke 2009; Venn 2009.
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policies because policy is affected by many other factors. For example, 
eunyoung ha’s87 work suggests that the impact of globalization on 
policy is conditional on veto structures—it may prove difficult for par-
ties in office to actually implement policy pledges. in government, par-
ties can respond to the pressures from globalization in various ways.88 
they might choose to maintain rather than cut welfare state benefits 
but fund them by increasing forms of taxation incident on labor or by 
reducing government borrowing.
 taxation has also been a central concern of the empirical literature on 
globalization. although the focus of this paper is on party programs, our 
argument would have less force if there were no traceable effect on policy. 
We note, however, that there are similar patterns for taxation. the eu-
ropean commission has compiled data on taxation across member states 
(and some prospective member states) since 1995 using a unified meth-
odology to ensure that figures are comparable.89 the eu reports annual 
figures for implicit tax rates on labor (lab_tax) and consumption (con-
smpt_tax), weighting individual taxes for their relevance to these broad 
categories. these figures allow us to estimate models for a twelve-year 
period (1995–2007) making use of all annual eurobarometer data on 
voter position, including up to twenty-eight countries and years where 
no data on party positions is provided by the cmp. the debate on taxa-
tion is complex, as suggested in the first section of this article. We test 
hypotheses consistent with our model of party positions without neces-
sarily allowing for all of these complexities and expect that: 1) globaliza-
tion forces tax rates down; 2) movement to the right of the median voter 
forces tax rates down; and 3) the further to the right the median voter, 
the smaller the impact of globalization. note that this implies negative 
coefficients on the first two variables and a positive coefficient on their 
interaction. the models include the lagged dependent variable. cases 
are in country years. the parameter estimates for regression 14 (lab_
tax) and regression 15 (consumpt_tax) conform to this pattern.90 thus 
there is some evidence that the pressures affecting party competition 
feed through to tax policy. the effects do not appear to operate in rela-
tion to all forms of taxation, but this might be expected given results in 
the existing literature.91 nevertheless, the results suggest that in future 
87 ha 2008.
88 adserà and boix 2002; hall and thelen 2009.
89 european commission 2009.
90 the high overall r2 values here result from high inertia in tax rates within countries and our 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
91 in similarly specified models of top income and corporate tax rates, the signs of the coefficients 
are also as predicted, but the variables fail to achieve significance. results are available from authors 
on request.
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studies the effects of globalization on government policies should be 
seen as contingent on the position of the median.
concluSionS
this study adds to the small number of attempts to formalize the ef-
fects of globalization. the model considers parties with policy goals 
and uncertainty so that the median voter exerts a pull but does not 
lead parties to fully converge. Globalization should only affect party 
competition if the expected position of the median is far enough to the 
left, in which case it moves left parties, and to a lesser extent the right 
parties, in a rightward direction. arguably the failure to recognize the 
importance of the interaction between globalization and the position 
of the median produces biased estimates of the effect of globalization. 
the reported empirical results support this argument over a range of 
model specifications. they suggest that globalization has an effect, but 
only if the expected median is relatively far to the left. Finally, global-
ization has differential effects on parties of the left and the right.
 the results on taxation suggest that it should be fruitful to apply the 
basic insight that the effects of globalization are contingent on the po-
sition of the median to relevant areas of policy outcomes—particularly 
those relating to the welfare state. the model depends on parties losing 
credibility with the electorate if their policies are infeasible given the 
pressures of globalization. We have not attempted to test this mecha-
nism in this study, partly because cross-national comparable data is dif-
ficult to find, but in reality the mechanism may be complex. Foreign-
exchange and financial markets may react only when they know what 
government is elected, so loss of electoral support may be delayed. if a 
coalition government forms, blame attribution may be even more indi-
rect. empirical work in this area using pooled data should prove fruit-
ful, although serious issues arise because of the endogeneity of policy 
and market reaction and because of the way that the policies of nations 
affect each other.92
 in sum, this study provides additional support for the literature on 
the contingent nature of the effects of globalization. similar to find-
ings in recent studies, a central implication is that pessimists have 
overstated the effects of globalization. nevertheless, globalization does 
have an effect on parties’ left-right positions, but the position of me-
dian voter mediates this effect. the central contribution of our study 
is to highlight the importance of the interaction between the position 
92 bernhard and leblang 2006.
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of the median voter and globalization. clearly, the positions taken up 
by parties in electoral competition are not the only influence on gov-
ernment policy, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that future 
empirical work on globalization needs to allow for the position of the 
median, which is still all too rare in the literature.
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